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Martin Buber has alleged that "Heidegger secular-
izes the Single One of Kierkegaard" and that "Heideg-
ger's man is a great and decisive step out from Kierke-
gaard in the direction of the edge where nothing be-
gins." 1 By the Single One is meant Kierkegaard's term, 
den Enkelte. Now, in his attempt at self-determina-
tion, Dasein (Heidegger's man), recognizes only fini-
tude, for Being discloses itself through Dasein as 
time. Den Enkelte, however, acknowledges the eternal 
both in himself as demonstrated by Anti-Climacus in The 
?.i.?lcJ}e-s^ unto Death, and outside of himself as illus-
trated by Vigilius Haufniensis in The Concept of Dread. 
Where Dasein is compelled to turn only to himself when 
conscience calls for authenticity or existential whole-
ness, den Enkelte is sustained by faith in eternity for 
his personal integrity or salvation. 
Actually, what accounts for the determinative dif-
ference between Dasein and den Enkelte is the volun-
tary, more specifically, resolution. Moreover, it is 
suggested that due to the primacy of its office, 
.resolution can even be termed the personal center of 
both modes of existence. Resolution is the determina-
tive factor in that it is through this phenomenon that 
Dasein and den Enkelte can attest the truth of their 
being, that is, authentic existence. 
However, the authenticity of their existence cannot 
be homogeneous because in the case of Dasein existence 
is capable of being understood by itself, whereas in 
the case of den Enkelte it cannot. The upshot is that 
an existence which finds its measure of truth in itself 
and one which does not are heterogeneous. Consequent-
ly, this radical dissimilarity renders it impossible 
for the one to be derived from the other. Hence, 
Buber's allegation that "Heidegger secularizes the 
Single One of Kierkegaard, that is, he severs the rela-
tion to the absolute for which Kierkegaard's man 
becomes a Single One,"* makes sense only if it is un-
derstood that by virtue of this very secularization, 
the one cannot be derived from the other. In this 
paper I shall argue that Heidegger's Dasein can neither 
derive from, nor be a secularization of, Kierkegaard's 
den Enkelte. 
193 
Auslegung, Vol. XIII. No. 2 
ISSN: 0733-4311 
It is obvious that the locutions "derives from" and 
"is a secularization of" or "secularizes" are key terms 
in this essay and as such deserve closer consideration. 
First of all, "derives from" implies the category of 
substance and answers to the question, "Derives from 
what?". "To be a secularization of" or "to secularize" 
implies that there is a religious prototype or model. 
Such a prototype, in the act of self-determination, ac-
knowledges a transcendent absolute by virtue of which 
it assumes its particular identity. Without this tran-
scendent factor, it would logically and ontologically 
be otherwise. If we approach the issue from the point 
of view of a model, that is, regard it isomorphically, 
then in fact we are pointing to the possibility of a 
duplication. It goes without saying, however, that a 
model thus configured, if at all duplicated, cannot 
yi.eld a secular version, that is, a being whose act of 
self-determination excludes the transcendence in ques-
tion. Nevertheless, Buber, when carefully analyzed, 
tends to impress upon us the idea that Heidegger con-
ceptually abused Kierkegaard's model. Buber leaves us 
with the impression that Dasein is a deficient version 
of a substantial form: as if den Enkelte has all the 
attributes and Dasein only some; as if den Enkelte, 
mutatis mutandis, has the right relations and Dasein 
not. 
It is true that the allegation notwithstanding, 
Buber did not attempt to demonstrate the process of 
secularization whereby Heidegger's man came into being. 
At best he contends that by nature and in virtue of his 
situation, man has a three-fold living relation: a 
relation to the world and to things, a relation to 
men—both to individuals and to the many—a relation to 
the mystery of being. Then Buber points out that the 
relation to things is virtually lacking in Kierkegaard 
whereas in Heidegger there is such a relation albeit 
only a technical, purposive one. 
But considering a thing merely in its applicability 
to a definite aim, i.e., its technical suitability, 
does not allow for an "essential" relation with it. 
For the technical aspect of the thing does not exhaust 
its "essential life." For example, a man may gaze 
without purpose on a tree, and another may look at it 
with a view to making a stick from the best branch. If 
man relates to things only technically he shortchanges 
himself for the simple reason that the whole reality of 
the thing has escaped him. 
Concerning the relation to individual men, Buber 
charges that to Kierkegaard it is a doubtful thing be-
cause of the exclusivity required by a God-relation-
ship. But while he admits the presence of such a rela-
tion in Heidegger, because it is one of solicitude 
only, it cannot be essential. On the other hand, the 
connexion with the faceless, formless, nameless many, 
with the "crowd," with the "one," is acknowledged in 
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both Kierkegaard and Heidegger. They rightly urge the 
overcoming of the tendency to assimilate with "that 
nameless human all and nothing" in order to attain 
selfhood.' Nonetheless, otherness cannot be peremp-
torily decried because it is required for a genuine and 
adequate self. 
Finally, man's third relation is to God or to the 
Absolute or to the mystery. This, according to Buber, 
is the sole essential relation for Kierkegaard, while 
in Heidegger it is completely lacking. Perhaps it is 
because of the paramountcy of God in Kierkegaard and 
the absolute absence of God in Heidegger, that the lat-
ter is charged with secularizing the former? It must 
be admitted that Buber's construal of both Kierkegaard 
and Heidegger is, to say the least, unorthodox. His 
contention, for example, that Heidegger secularizes the 
Single One of Kierkegaard in that he severs the rela-
tions to the absolute for which Kierkegaard's man 
becomes a Single One is unfounded. But even if that 
were the case, because there is no absolute in the be-
ing of Dasein, and because of its inexpugnable presence 
in den Enkelte, it is otiose to derive the one from the 
other. Between them yawns a formidable gulf; in other 
words, they are worlds apart. 
Entschlossenheit (in Heidegger) and Beslutning (in 
Kierkegaard) both involve decision. But more than mere 
decision, resolution is "the crucial beginning of ac-
tion that anticipates and reaches through all action."" 
At the inception of action a prior determination to 
ward off obstacles or minimize their import has been 
reached, thereby giving impetus and adding momentum to 
the action. Concurrently the increment in momentum 
."consolidates life and reassures the individual in his 
own mind."* There is, therefore, a serenity about 
resolution. This lack of tension, this unruffled re-
pose, this inviting contentment is witnessed as appar-
ently characterizing the ethical achievements of Judge 
William. But however inviting the contentment, it does 
not induce the dolce far niente of a thoughtless 
existence. The tensions of existence are ever present 
but are masterfully held in check by the firmly-focused 
vision and the unswerving direction of resolution. 
Whether the Judge meets this standard is another 
matter. "A serious choice of himself would not au-
tomatically bring him to a lovely concord of freedom 
and nature, man and wife, individual and society. It 
would isolate him before God in the awareness of his 
inadequacy to render account of himself."' 
Nevertheless, resolution or self-choice, as the ul-
timate act of freedom, is nothing other than the recog-
nition of one's nothingness in relation to God--and in 
this a man's self acquires absolute worth. Resolution 
is therefore edifying, and, as the Jutland priest ex-
presses it in his "Ultimatum": "It proves its edifying 
power in a double way: partly by the fact that it 
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checks doubt and allays the solicitude of doubt; partly 
by the fact that it animates to action." 7 Unencumbered 
by the ankylosis of doubt, the ethical individual 
strives onward to action, anxious only of not being 
able to maintain the resolution, yet bent on its 
upkeeping. As a result, resolution "joyfully recruits 
its strength by repose," as the Judge puts it.* It is 
this tendency to recharge itself that disqualifies 
resolution as faith, the Judge notwithstanding. But 
though resolution is not faith, the striving must go 
on, for the tensions do not cease. Short of self-
choice (in "Equilibrium") and resolution (in "Aesthetic 
Validity of Marriage" and again in "Various Observa-
tions about Marriage in Reply to Objections"), the in-
dividual is in despair. And as Anti-Climacus observes, 
the cause of despair is the eternal, for "if there were 
nothing eternal in a man, he could not despair." 9 Man 
is constitutionally in despair, "and every means we 
have of coping with this despair, short of religion, is 
either unsuccessful or demoniacal." 1 0 As depicted in 
the two psychological works, The Concept of Dread and 
The Sickness unto Death, "a human life consists gen-
erally in a series of failed projects, each doomed from 
the outset by its own inherent contradiction or by the 
incapacity of creatures who are themselves bundles of 
contradictions to sustain them." 1 1 
It is important to note, then, that in Kierkegaard 
despair is the necessary condition for self-choice or 
resolution, and that the cause of despair is the pres-
ence of the eternal, a prime factor in the tension of 
existence. It is only when the individual, in being 
himself and willing to be himself, acknowledges his 
relationship to God by heeding the eternal that he van-
quishes despair with faith. 
Dread, too, is integral to Dasein. "L'angoisse," 
writes Jean Wahl, "est le fond permanent de nos senti-
ments, et chez Kierkegaard, et chez Heidegger." 1* (In 
both Kierkegaard and Heidegger dread is the basis of 
our feelings). But in Heidegger dread or anxiety 
(Angst) is basically a phenomenon of finitude. The 
ways in which this finitude is manifested are Dasein's 
dependence on things, his facticity (thrownness), and 
death. But granted this "need" to dwell in the midst 
of things other than himself, "by which he is sustain-
ed, on which he is dependent," he can never, try as he 
may with all his cultural apparatus and advanced tech-
nology, be master of them. Furthermore, dependent on 
things that he is not, "man is, at bottom, not even 
master of himself." 1 3 Werner Marx has recalled that if 
Dasein could not project things in their sense of 
Being, that is, if he had no understanding of Being, he 
would not be able to relate to them and to himself. 
"It is in this sense that the 'privilege of existing' 
contains the 'need of the understanding of Being' 
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within itself. Understanding of Being is 'the most 
finite in the finite'.",,' 
Facticity as a structural moment of care also dis-
closes Dasein's finitude. It should be remembered that 
facticity depicts Dasein as already abandoned and com-
pelled to cope with the fact, wherefore his being an 
issue for himself. Finding himself in being, he 
discovers that he exists in spite of himself. James 
Clark, displaying very little tolerance for Heidegger, 
comments: "But here we may observe that in association 
with the employment of the rather aggressive words 
'throw' and 'abandon' the uncanniness of the pristine 
dimension takes on the aspect of the chamber of horrors 
with which 'anxiety' is so apt." 1 5 Existence may well 
be a chamber of horrors, nevertheless it must be perpe-
tuated . 
This "nullity" in his being over which he can never 
become master, i.e., that his having been thrown is not 
his doing (he is not his own source) also indicates 
that as a process his is a Being still-to-be-achieved. 
That is what Heidegger means by the statement: "Exis-
tenzialitat ist wesenhaft durch Faktizitat bestimmt."" 
(Existentiality is always determined by facticity). 
So, then, there is a not to his origin and a not to his 
Being. Dasein's existence is permeated by nullity. It 
is nullity with which Dasein is compelled to cope; it 
is the nullity disclosed by Angst. 
Therefore, dread, as the comprehensive disposition 
of Dasein, occasions the decisive moment for the re-
collection of self. 1 7 There is, then, a double move-
ment in the experience of dread: negatively, it dis-
closes the nullity of Dasein's basis; positively, it 
indicates self-choice or resolution (Entschlossenheit). 
Accordingly, if in Kierkegaard the necessary condition 
for resolution (Beslutning) is despair (Fortvivlelse), 
then in Heidegger the necessary condition for 
Entschlossenheit is dread or anxiety (Angst). But 
where in Kierkegaard despair is engendered by the ur-
gency of the eternal, in Heidegger Angst is grounded in 
Zeitlichkeit (temporality) which, after all, accounts 
for the structural unity of care. And what is 
Zeitlichkeit if not "das ursprungliche 'Ausser-sich' an 
und fur sich selbst"? (The primordial "outside-of-
itself" in and for itself, SZ 329). In other words, 
Dasein's essential grief is that while he is compelled 
to carry out the process of existence, permeated though 
it be by nullity, he is nevertheless constrained to en-
dure his Sisyphus-situation, considering that he exists 
in and for himself. Here lies the main gravamen of 
Wyschogrod's charge against Heidegger's version of 
Being, and, mutatis mutandis, the reason that Dasein 
cannot emerge out of den Enkelte. 
Referring to the hopelessness of Dasein's anxiety-
ridden existence, Wyschogrod*writes: "But Heidegger's 
dread is a dread on behalf of a Self that is not some-
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thing other than dread but dread itself. Dread on 
behalf of something that itself is dread would seem to 
be somewhat self-defeating because that which is at 
stake in dread can be provided only by something other 
than the dread itself." 1 1 And the desperation of this 
situation or the untenability of such a position is at-
tributable, Wyschogrod argues, to the very essence of 
Zeitlichkeit itself as construed by Heidegger. But 
first, let us consider a Heideggerian expatiating on 
time. 
Henri Birault, a faithful exponent of Heidegger, 
whose projected book for which the article "Existence 
et verite d'apres Heidegger" was a first sketch and 
which would have pre-empted Richardson's massive 
Heidegger: Through Phenomeno 1 ogy to TJiou_g_ht, 1 9 writes 
apropos of Zeitlichkeit: 
Le temps, ou plutot la temporalization du temps, 
est la transcendance elle-meme, 'le transcendant 
pur et simple'. Le temps est en soi hors de soi. 
Cela ne signifie pas gu'il est tout ensemble a 
l'interieur et a l'exterieur de lui-meme. Cela 
veut dire-que, dans son etre le plus intime, il 
est 1'exteriorite comme telle. 2 0 
(Time, or rather the temporalization of time, is tran-
scendence itself, "the transcendent pure and simple." 
In itself time is outside of itself. This does not 
mean that it is altogether inside and outside of it-
self. It means rather that in essence time is exter-
nality as such). Time generating itself without any 
other reference, time flowing from itself back into it-
self, issuing from nothing other than itself and forth 
into nothing other than itself because there is nothing 
else! Hence when Birault indicates that "dans son etre 
le plus intime, il est 1'exteriorite comme telle," I 
take this to mean that apart from the process of self-
generation, whose movement, as transcendence, is out-
side of itself but also in and for itself, as was 
earlier observed, nothing is left. Temporality is thus 
the process inclined to depart from itself: it is the 
ekstatikon. The term used by Wyschogrod to charac-
terize this "outward" tendency of time is "extended-
ness." 
In his totality Dasein is to be grasped as "Sich-
vorweg-schon-sein-in (der-Welt-) als Sein-bei (inner-
weltlich begegnendem Seienden)" (SZ 192), that is, 
"ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being-
alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)." 2 1 
To Wyschogrod the plethora of hyphens is signifi-
cant, for it bespeaks extension; indeed, the intention 
is "to spread out the essence of Dasein into a field 
that understands Dasein as possibility in an existenti-
alistic sense." 2 2 He charges Heidegger with attempting 
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to "dissolve any entity into extended componenti-
ality." 2' And this, to the very eternity of God. 
He considers a footnote in Sein und Zeit where 
Heidegger criticizes the traditional conception of 
eternity as signifying a "standing now" (nunc stans), 
which is allegedly derived from the vulgar understand-
ing of world-time. According to Heidegger, if God's 
eternity can be philosophically construed, then it 
should be as "ursprunglichere und 'unendliche' Zeit-
lichkeit" (SZ 427 n.), that is, "a more primordial tem-
porality which is infinite" (BT 499 n . ) . Wyschogrod 
interprets this consideration by Heidegger to mean that 
not only is eternity intussuscepted by temporality, but 
is so transformed as "to extend the field of Being 
unendingly thereby making it something that is ahead of 
itself in an unending way."1'* Since eternity, or pure 
Being, as Wyschogrod prefers to call it, is thus an-
nulled and removed from "the catalogue of ontological 
structures," the result is a bleak ontology: 
There is no One that is not dissolved at its root 
into an extended relationship with itself that 
gives it direction and componentiality. Not only 
is there not in man or Dasein a measure of pure 
Being to which, as in Kierkegaard, he must relate 
himself, but there is no pure Being in any place 
because timeliness, as the root of Dasein's Care, 
engulfs everything in its ecstatic structure. 1* 
Hence Zeitlichkeit, rendered by Wyschogrod as time-
liness, is indeed the transcendent pure and simple to 
which Henri Birault referred above. "Time, or rather 
the temporalization of time," i.e., Zeitlichkeit, is 
essentially "outside of itself," to boot, is "exter-
nality as such." Temporality engulfs everything in its 
ecstatic structure, leaving nothing outside of itself, 
for it is its own externality in the form of 
extendedness. Therefore, Wyschogrod observes, the dis-
solution of Being into timeliness, where the latter is 
a field of extendedness (Dasein), directly relates to 
the basic experience of dread. As he puts it, 
"Heidegger's dread is a dread on behalf of a Self that 
is not something other than dread but dread itself." 
And if there is nothing besides temporality, then 
Dasein is verily trapped; for the necessary condition 
for Entschlossenheit is Angst, and the call of con-
science, however benevolent in its salvific office, 
functions in terms of Dasein's guilt, which is grounded 
in nullity or finitude. 
But if the basic feature of Dasein is his Being-in-
the-world, then with death this same "Being-in-the-
world is at stake." 1' For temporality, which is the 
transcendental structure of Dasein, is also the "mean-
ing," i.e., the "whereto" (Woraufhin) of the primary 
project, which consists of a "being-in and a being-
199 
toward, always a caring-for, worrying about, trying to 
avoid, striving for, being afraid of, hoping for, 
etc." 1 7 Temporality is the "inner possibility" of 
care, Dasein*s structural unity. Hence, since tem-
porality accounts for the perpetuation of existence in 
that it is the ground of possibilities, it likewise ac-
counts for the utmost possibility of impossibility, 
namely, death. In this way, the totality of Dasein is 
articulated as finite, having an origin and an end im-
posed on him as his distinctive mode of being. 
But the totality of Dasein and his authenticity are 
correlative concepts in Heidegger. And since this 
paper has undertaken to demonstrate how Dasein cannot 
derive from den Enkelte, it behooves us to disclose 
them both in their very authenticity, that is, when 
they are maximally themselves. Heidegger is deliberate 
about the interdependence of totality and authenticity, 
for if Dasein's Being is to be interpreted primordi-
ally, as a basis for the question of ontology, "dann 
muss sie das Sein des Daseins zuvor in seiner moglichen 
Eigentlichkeit und Ganzheit existenzial ans Licht ge-
bracht haben" (then it must first have brought to light 
existentially the Being of Dasein in its possibilities 
of authenticity and totality, SZ 233). The possibili-
ties of authenticity and totality} then, encompass 
death as Dasein's utmost possibility. 
Now in the everyday immersion in the world of his 
care, Dasein is unable to achieve totality because "die 
Alltaglichkeit ist doch gerade das Sein 'zwischen' 
Geburt und Tod" (Everydayness is precisely that Being 
which is "between" birth and death, SZ 233). Never-
theless, the totality of Dasein must include his death, 
and since everydayness (which is between birth and 
death) obviates its attainment, then obviously death 
has to be construed not so much as a ceasing-to-be, not 
an ending in the sense of fulfillment, but as something 
quite different. Heidegger writes: "Das mit dem Tod 
gemeinte Enden bedeutet kein Zu-Ende-sein des Daseins, 
sonder ein Sein zum Ende dieses Seienden. Der Tod ist 
eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein ubernimmt sobald es 
ist" (The "ending" which we have in view when we speak 
of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end, 
but a Being-towards-the-end of this entity. Death is a 
way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is, SZ 
245, BT 289). 
To illustrate what he means by ending as fulfill-
ment, Heidegger adduces as an example the ripeness of a 
fruit. In the process of ripening, the unripeness 
(that which the fruit is not yet) is not something that 
will be added subsequently to the fruit. As a matter 
of fact, contribute to it what you will, the unripeness 
of the fruit would not thereby be eliminated, if it did 
not come to ripeness of its own accord (vom ihm selbst 
her zur Reife, SZ 243). It is clear, then, that "The 
'not-yet' has already been included in the very Being 
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of the fruit, not as some random characteristic, but as 
something constitutive. Correspondingly, as long as 
any Dasein is, it too is already its 'not-yet'" (BT 
288). 
Hence death, regarded not as an ending in the sense 
of fulfillment, but as a Being-towards-the-end, signi-
fies a relation that Dasein has to himself. As a self-
relation, therefore, death can manifest itself either 
authentically or inauthentically. 
In Being and Time Dasein in his everydayness is 
delineated as existing under the dictorship of the 
"they" (das Man), considering himself as one among 
many. When the "they" speaks of death, "death is un-
derstood as an indefinite something which, above all, 
must duly arrive from somewhere or other, but which is 
proximally not yet present-at^hand for oneself, and is 
therefore no threat" (BT 297). Although the certainty 
of death is not thereby denied, it is nonetheless 
merely "the empirical certainty of demise, and evades 
the authentic Being-certain of Dasein's own death." 2 t 
In this way the "when" of death is so distant that it 
is virtually irrelevant. Hence the possibility of its 
occurrence at any moment is covered up. 
In everydayness, then, death is inauthentic. And 
Heidegger, despite his claim not to be engaged in a 
moralising critique of everyday Dasein (einer morali-
sierenden Kritik des alltaglichen Daseins, SZ 167) does 
not conceal his condemnation of inauthentic everyday-
ness. He refers to this mode of being, that is, the 
process of "getting entangled" (verfangt) in inauthen-
tic everydayness as a "downward plunge" (Absturz) as 
"die Bodenlosigkeit und Nichtigkeit der uneigentlichen 
Alltaglichkeit" (the groundlessness and nullity of 
inauthentic everydayness, SZ 178). 
Since relating himself to death inauthentically is 
not the desideratum of Dasein's essence, then death not 
as demise (Ableben) but as dying (Sterben) is to be 
considered, because this is the way of Being in which 
Dasein qua Dasein is towards his death. In this mode 
death is regarded not so much as an empirical certainty 
but as a possibility. As such, it concerns Dasein 
directly, in his first-personal immediacy. 
If the emphasis is on death as possibility, the 
point, then, is not to brood over it in the hope of 
knowing the exact moment of its actualization, thereby 
taking away its character as a possibility, but rather, 
"it must be understood as a possibility, it must be 
cultivated as a possibility, and we must put up with it 
as a possibility, in the way we comport ourselves to-
wards it1*" (BT 306). So, actualizing his possibility is 
out of the question, since that would only bring about 
his own demise. Brooding over it is also out of the 
question, as this tends to be a calculation of how to 
have death at his disposal, thereby turning it into 
something ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, in brief, 
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"what is attainable, controllable, practicable" (BT 
305). The alternative is to conduct himself towards 
his death by "expecting it" (im Erwarten). It is 
within the internal dialectic of expecting that what is 
expected (the possible) has its raj.son d'etre in the 
actual. "By the very nature of expecting, the possible 
is drawn into the actual, arising out of the actual and 
returning to it" BT 306). 
When Dasein regards death as a genuine possibility, 
his mode of being is termed by Heidegger Vorlaufen, 
i.e., anticipation. Instead of trying to calculate 
"when" death will occur, the aim being to be so pre-
pared for it (as if thus one could strike up a deal 
with death), one must rather cultivate the indefinite-
ness of the certainty. The point is to be always on 
the qui vive, whereby "Dasein opens itself to a con-
stant threat arising out of its own 'there'." No 
doubt, since being vigilant for death is tantamount to 
peering into the abyss of Being in the form of noth-
ingness, a courageous state of mind is required for the 
task, namely, anxiety. "In this state-of-mind, Dasein 
finds itself face to face with the 'nothing' of the 
possible impossibility of existence." Being face to 
face with "nothing" leaves one quite alone, extremely 
alone, and that is why Heidegger avers that "anticipa-
tion utterly individualizes Dasein." And the full im-
plication of this individuation is emphasized in Being 
and Time: 
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in 
the they-self, and brings it face to face with 
the possibility of being itself, primarily unsup-
ported by concernful solicitude, but of being it-
self, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards-
death--a freedom which has been released from the 
Illusions of the "they", and'which is factical, 
certain of itself, and anxious. (BT 311) 
Anxiety sustains anticipation, anticipation indiv-
idualizes Dasein, and since the process of individua-
tion is one in which Dasein is released from the grand 
illusions of anonymity, Dasein is left in the purity of 
his solus ip_se. In this pristine mode of being he is 
authentically himself. Wherefore the corollary to the 
above quotation: 
Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of 
understanding one's ownmost potentiality-for-
Being--that is to say, the possibility of authen-
tic existence. 
Authenticity is a thorny problem in the early Hei-
degger because of the unresolved tension between the 
authentic!ty-inauthenticity correlation (hence the de-
nial that it is "some concrete possible idea of exis-
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tence") and the admission that "a factical ideal of 
Dasein," i.e., authentic existence, underlies the on-
tological interpretation of Dasein's existence. This 
tension has induced Douglas Kellner to remark that 
"Heidegger's contrast between inauthenticity and au-
thenticity indicates he is maintaining an axiological 
dualism which he dialectically develops, spelling out 
oppositions and differences between authentic and in-
authentic ways of being." Consequently, "this inter-
pretation would suggest that Heidegger's analysis of an 
inauthentic existence contains a negative evaluation of 
everyday behaviour, whereas the concept of authenticity 
contains an ideal of being human." 1' But Heidegger's 
friend from the Marburg years, the theologian Rudolf 
Bultmann, finds it inadmissible to view Heidegger's 
concept of authenticity as the expression of an ideal 
for existence: 
For what is characterized by the concept of 'au-
thenticity ' --at least by intention--is the his-
toricity of man, whose being is a possibility of 
being, a being that can be authentic and ^ a u -
thentic—whereby 'authenticity' can be defined 
formally as taking place in resolution and 
whereby it remains completely open what particu-
lar thing is resolved upon. Therefore, the 
historicity of man is not an ideal that emerges 
out of the real factuality of man's experiences 
of life, but, since it characterizes man as such, 
is what first makes possible such experiences as 
human experiences and thus also the emergence of 
'ideals for existence.' 1 0 
But Bultmann, in equating authenticity with historic-
ity, and making of the latter a generic characteriza-
tion of being human, does not alleviate the tension but 
virtually glosses over it. On the other hand, Kell-
ner' s ascription of an axiological dualism to the gen-
eral tenor of Being and Time is cogent, a dualism that 
might have eventuated in spite of Heidegger himself. 
For it is unlikely that a philosopher can undertake a 
formal description of human existence without his own 
evaluative perspective being operative therein. 
We have dwelt enough on Heideggerian authenticity 
to be able now to contrast adequately Dasein and den 
Enkelte. The tension just referred to between the 
authenticity--inauthenticity correlation and authentic-
ity as an ideal makes only minimal difference. For in 
either form of authenticity, Dasein maintains his on-
tological structure as constituted by temporality, and 
it is with the self-constitution of temporality that 
the principle of den Enkelte is fundamentally at vari-
ance. 
It should be recalled that Kierkegaard, in "A First 
and Last Declaration" at the conclusion of the Con-
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eluding Unscientific Postscript, entreated his readers 
not to identify him with the pseudonyms. Exponents of 
Kierkegaard do not hesitate in underscoring the signif-
icance of construction and style in the works, and the 
pseudonymity is part and parcel of it. Thus Billeskov 
Jansen: "Each feature of his writing is calculated and 
premeditated, even the violent outbursts which played 
so subtle and complicated a game with the pseudonyms 
also controlled the variations in form within each 
work. 1 , 1 1 And Louis Mackey writes: "When Kierkegaard 
signed his books with impossible names like Johannes de 
Silentio . . . and Vigilius Haufniensis . . ., no one 
in the gossipy little world of Danish letters had any 
doubt about their origin. Nor did he mean they should; 
his purpose was not mystification but distance." 1 1 So 
that when Kierkegaard is accused of irrationalism, as 
so often happens, it is because little heed had been 
paid to this factor of his art. Thus Alastair Mc-
Kinnon: "At least most of the problem disappears when 
we recognize that the doctrine of the stages was an in-
tellectual framework specifically designed to achieve 
and promote a particular effect and that it is not 
taken seriously by Kierkegaard in his private 
person. 1 1 1 1 And McKinnon also notes that the terms 
"paradox" and "absurd" (which usually catalyze the 
charge of irrationalism) are restricted by Kierkegaard 
to the aesthetic works: 
The fact that words such as Absurde and Paradoks 
are confined to the pseudonymous literature 
surely means that his "irrationalism" (if that is 
what it is) is itself confined thereto. But, 
again, those works are not his works, nor are its 
views his view. Instead, as he insisted, it was 
a deliberately contrived artifice addressed to an 
aesthetic generation and calculated to point them 
in the direction of faith.1'* 
Both the pseudonymous and edifying works, then, 
were aimed by Kierkegaard at provoking the reader into 
spiritual awakening, to crimp the waters of his soul, 
as it were. His was a maieutic art, hence he withdrew 
from it, the focus being not on himself but on the 
reader. Nevertheless, if purity of heart is to will 
one thing," then as a religious author employing a 
maieutic art, Kierkegaard never deviated from the 
course he took. "Once and for all I must earnestly beg 
the kind reader always to bear in mente that the 
thought behind the whole work is: what it means to 
become a Christian."" 
Provoking the reader into becoming the single in-
dividual (den Enkelte) was more or less the gist of the 
works; and Kierkegaard employed several personae as 
agents provocateurs. For this reason, in contrasting 
Dasein with den Enkelte, I consider it circumspect to 
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do so via the pseudonymous personae themselves. Of 
course, insofar as the personae are means to an end, 
there is a continuity between them and the author. 
This continuity is the author's message. In the case 
of Kierkegaard this message emerges from the Christian 
context, and the Christian context is centered on the 
doctrine of creation. Behind the "poetic expressions" 
that are the pseudonymous personae, then, there is the 
unity of the doctrine of creation as presupposition. 
But if the formidable Karl Barth can confess that "in 
taking up the doctrine of creation I have entered a 
sphere in which I feel less confident and sure,"' 7 
imagine my trepidation in even mentioning the subject 
itself! Then let us quickly move on. 
Dasein, it was said, is constituted by temporality, 
where temporality was viewed by Wyschogrod as the dis-
solution of Being into sheer extendedness. In the mel-
lifluous prose of Birault, temporality "est la tran-
scendance elle-meme, 'le transcendant pur et simple;" 
it is "sans autre reference," and "cela veut dire que, 
dans son etre le plus intime, il est 1'exteriorite 
comme telle." It was also pointed out that Angst is 
grounded in temporality, and that this latter exists 
"in and for itself." It is for this reason that 
Wyschogrod laments Dasein's Sisyphus-situation, main-
taining that Heidegger's position is self-defeating 
because, according to him, that which is at stake in 
dread can be provided only by something other than the 
dread itself. In the world of Kierkegaard, it was 
said, despair is engendered by the urgency of the eter-
nal. What does this mean? 
Unlike Dasein, from whose ontological structure the 
eternal is exempt, den Enkelte is determined by his 
relation to the eternal. But how is eternity to be 
understood? Is it really the "nunc stans" implied by 
the "'constant' presence-at-hand imputed by Heidegger 
to tradition's conception of it? And is eternity as 
understood by the Greeks the same as that of Christian 
tradition? Hans-Georg Gadamer, a disciple of Heideg-
ger, explains: 
What we call eternity is . . ., as is claimed by 
the theological tradition of Christianity, a 
concept which has as background the ontological 
distinction between creator and creature. This 
concept does not exist in Greek thought, not even 
in Platonic thought, which divided the 
"invisible" world of ideal Being in the sense of 
aidion, from the visible world of Becoming, which 
lacks Being . . . To be sure it was precisely 
Plato, who in giving the first definition of 
time, called it the "moving image of eternity." 
But the word which he used here is gion. Aion 
itself means a temporal phenomenon. The word is 
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used above all for "lifetime" and then this mean-
ing is transformed to "unlimited duration."" 
Since in Greek thought time and change were inseparable 
correlates, eternity was conceived as qualitatively 
different from time, for the distinction had to be such 
that change was exempt from eternity. Hence, whereas 
everything in time changes, nothing in eternity does. 
Wherefore the Platonic definition of time as "the mov-
ing image of eternity." Or, as the theologian Oscar 
Cullmann puts it, "Time in Plato's view is only the 
copy of eternity." Eternity so viewed is timelessness. 
Cullmann continues: "How much the thinking of our days 
roots in Hellenism, and how little in Biblical Chris-
tianity, becomes clear to us when we confirm the fact 
that far and wide the Christian Church and Christian 
theology distinguish time and eternity in the Platonic-
Greek manner."" Cullmann's studies of primitive 
Christianity have resulted in the conviction that eter-
nity then was understood as endless duration: 
Eternity, which is possible only as an attribute 
of God, is time, or, to put it better, what we 
call "time" is nothing but a part, defined and 
delimited by God, of this same unending duration 
of God's time. Nowhere does this come so clearly 
to expression as in the already established fact 
that the word used to express eternity, aion 
("age"), is the same word that is also applied to 
a limited division of time; otherwise expressed, 
between what we call eternity and what we call 
time, that is, between everlastingly continuing 
time and limited time, the New Testament makes 
absolutely no difference in terminology. Eterni-
ty is the endless succession of the ages 
(aiones). 4 0 
It is obvious that we cannot go on to eternity on 
this subject, not so much because of its nature as 
such, as that it can easily lure us to be unwilling 
custodians of a kettle of fish. What the above cita-
tions have done is to connect unequivocally eternity 
with the New Testament and the doctrine of creation, 
thus paving the way for den Enkelte. 
Now it is an understatement to say that Kierkegaard 
knew both Greek philosophy and the New Testament very 
well. He was rather au fait with them. The interest-
ing thing now is to observe what he can do with the 
conceptual categories of both worlds. And if eternity 
as understood by the Greeks is unlike eternity within 
the Christian context, then the dissimilarity becomes 
evident with the personae themselves. 
The first thing to notice is that in the world of 
Soren Kierkegaard "the eternal" is applied to both God 
and man. But "it will become evident that he means 
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different things when he uses 'eternal' of man and God. 
There is, however, a formal consistency in his use of 
'eternal'. 'Eternal' always refers to unchangeability 
and to possibi lity.'"•1 In the hands of the personae 
this characteristic of unchangeability and possibility, 
when applied to man, is consistently attributed to the 
self, which both is and becomes. Thus, Judge William: 
But what, then, is this self of mine: If I were 
required to define this, my first answer would 
be: It is the most abstract of all things, and 
yet at the same time it is the most concrete — it 
is freedom.** 
Johannes Climacus: 
The goal of movement for an existing individual 
is to arrive at a decision, and to renew it. The 
eternal is extraneous to the movement of life, 
and a concrete eternity within the existing in-
dividual is the maximum degree of his passion.* 1 
Vigilius Haufniensis: 
Man is a sythesis of the soulish and the bodily. 
But a synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not 
united in a third factor. This third factor is 
spirit.** 
The synthesis of the soulish and the bodily is to 
be posited by spirit, but the spirit is eternal. 
(CD 81) 
Anti-Climacus: 
Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is 
the self. (SD 146) 
The self is composed of infinity and finitiness. 
But the synthesis is a relationship, and it is a 
relationship which, though it is derived, relates 
itself to itself, which means freedom. The self 
is freedom. (SD 162) 
The self is the factor of continuity throughout the 
changes of becoming. The self is that which changes, 
yet it is not the case "that the self is comprised of 
self-identical (unchanging) substratum (substance) in 
which constantly changing experiences (accidents) 
inhere."** What constitutes the structure of the self 
in Judge William and Anti-Climacus, of man in 
Haufniensis, and of the existing individual in Johannes 
Climacus, is freedom. Properly speaking, then, the 
self is freedom. Therefore,' the pseudonyms concur that 
what is eternal in the self is freedom. 
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In time the self actualizes its possibilities, and 
these possibilities-become-actualities in turn engender 
their own possibilities. What is not subject to 
change, because it is outside the realm of time, is 
freedom. Freedom here is not an attribute inherent in 
some substance. It is the very being of the self. And 
since the actualization of possibilities (which is a 
process of becoming) presupposes freedom as a constant 
factor, the self and man and the existing individual 
are characterized as temporal and eternal, each becom-
ing what he ijs. Such is "eternal" when applied to man: 
it is the presupposition of his very self-actuali-
zation. 
But if self-actualization occurs through the eter-
nal in time, and these two factors are held to be 
qualitatively different, then how account for the con-
tiguity presupposed by their co-presence in man? 
Haufniensis' answer: "The instant is that ambiguous 
moment in which time and eternity touch one another, 
thereby positing the temporal, where time is constantly 
intersecting eternity and eternity constantly permeat-
ing time" (CD 80). To Climacus, "the Eternal, which 
hitherto did not exist, came into existence in this 
moment," and "in the Moment man becomes conscious that 
he is born; for his antecedent state, to which he may 
not cling, was one of non-being."*' And Climacus gives 
to the moment the distinctive name: the Fullness of 
Time, by which he means Christ as the absolute paradox. 
Following the same line of thought, Jean Wahl writes: 
"L'eternel a un commencement et un achievement tempore 1. 
Ce qui est eternel, un instant auparavant n'etait 
pas"* 7 (The eternal has a beginning and a temporal 
conclusion. That which is eternal a moment ago was 
not). These are expressions for the entrance of the 
eternal into the temporal "at the opportune moment for 
decision": "man, not being born eternal, becomes 
eternal;" and "man becomes conscious of himself as be-
ing born anew."** Haufniensis, making reference to the 
concept of Kairos in Christianity, writes: "The 
concept around which everything turns in Christianity, 
the concept which makes all things new, is the fullness 
of time, is the instant as eternity, and yet this eter-
nity is at once the future and the past" (CD 81). The 
past here is not a concatenation of objectified nows 
which have congealed in the flux of time and are now 
irrevocably "out there" in the objective order of 
things. The past is retained in memory as present 
possibilities, for they serve as condition for present 
action. Schrag, with characteristic lucidity, 
elaborates: "The cardinal significance of the Christ-
event is that it is a contemporaneous reality in the 
Christian's personal decision. Christ's coming is not 
to be identified with an objectivized and fixed 
historical incident. Rather it expresses a repeatable 
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possibility. Christ 'comes again' in each responsible 
decision."*' 
Mow what of "eternal" when applied to God? How is 
God eternal? If the will of God is the well-being of 
man, God must, as far as man is concerned, be worthy of 
his confidence. And if God has revealed Himself to man 
through the human agency of His Son, then the Word of 
the Son, too, must deserve man's absolute trust. This 
means that whatever the Son said had to be irrevocable. 
In other words, God is unchangeable. 
In the edifying discourse entitled "The Un-
changeableness of God," Kierkegaard turns to the 
Epistle of James for inspiration: "Every good thing 
bestowed and every perfect gift is from above, coming 
down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no 
variation, or shifting shadow" (James 1:17). Whatever 
is good for man comes from God, and God, in giving His 
Word to man, does so with His own light: revelation. 
And what is revealed is not subject to change because 
the will of Him who is the source knows no variation. 
Nevertheless, man, who keeps changing his mind while 
calculating the best avenues to worldly success, is 
called to his either/or. "For with this immutable will 
you must nevertheless some time, sooner or later, come 
to collision—this immutable will, which desired that 
you should consider this because it desired your wel-
fare; this immutable will, which cannot but crush you 
if you come into hostile collision with it." s o 
So, it is up to man to decide whether his collision 
with the Eternal will be hostile or not. And, as 
Kierkegaard benevolently warns, hostile opposition will 
induce guaranteed annihilation. God's eternity is ex-
pressed in His unchangeableness, and His unchangeable-
ness characterizes His will, which is the well-being of 
man. 
Within the context of the existence-spheres or the 
stages, Christian faith is the telos of existence. 
With the consciousness of sin, that is, the ac-
knowledgement that the measure of my being transcends 
my human powers, man is virtually alone before God, and 
in this mode of being he is maximally himself. By con-
trast, Dasein is maximally himself in the anticipation 
of death, when death is construed as possibility. 
Now, since what renders den Enkelte authentic is 
his sin-consciousness and concomitantly the gift of 
faith, it is impossible that an existence whose struc-
ture is devoid of the necessary condition for sin or 
faith be derived from him. As has been remarked in 
various ways, in Heidegger, "the self emerges as 
'primordial time', which manifests itself in terms of 
temporalization provided by imaginative systhesis." s 1 
Constituting and directing himself temporally, Dasein 
does so as the very meaning of Being, where Being is 
construed as a horizon which is projected by Dasein. 
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This horizon is the world, the wherewithal of the self-
disclosure of things. 
Furthermore, the heterogeneity between Dasein and 
den Enkelte can be indicated thus: In virtue of 
Dasein's referential dependence on things and his ex-
istence as their meaning, he cannot commence to make 
the movement of infinite resignation, the prerequisite 
of faith, without his ontological structure dis-
sipating. For how can he, as the structural unity of 
care, let go of what is presupposed by care? Not only 
is Dasein unable to approximate Silentio's knight of 
faith, he cannot even assimilate to the knight of in-
finite resignation. This is because infinite resigna-
tion, although presupposing the world, also means that 
man is not absolutely dependent on it. That is why 
Buber's version of den Enkelte in "The Question to the 
Single One" in his book Between Man and Man is a skewed 
rendition. The distortion consists in the allegation, 
and its implications, that "the relation to things is 
lacking in Kierkegaard . . . he knows things only as 
similes." s a 
I suspect that Buber is referring to Climacus, 
especially to the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
where the propositions central to the argument of the 
book are that the ethical reality of the subject is the 
sole reality, and that every other reality encountered 
by him is in the mode of possibility, that is, by the 
subject thinking them. But if Buber's claim carries 
weight, then it would be quite impossible to make the 
movement of infinite resignation. Resignation, after 
all, must be understood as neither scorn nor indiffer-
ence but as a strenuous effort on the part of the in-
dividual to maintain a "continued resistance to the ab-
solute claims of the relative and immediate, and it is 
a calm, balanced valuation of the actual world." 5 1 We 
are mindful, however, that Silentio is not a philo-
sopher, but writes poetice et eleganter, writing only 
for the luxury of writing (FT 24). 
Furthermore, this calm, balanced valuation of the 
actual world results from the clear recognition of the 
duplex character of human existence, i.e., composed of 
the finite and the infinite, and the courage to abide 
their oppositional pull. This insight, then, obviates 
scorn, and since passion undergirds courage, then in-
difference, too, is peremptorily ruled out. But then, 
it may be pointed out, what of the following charac-
terization by Climacus of someone who has made the 
movement of infinite resignation? 
Let the world give him everything, it is possible 
that he will see fit to accept it. But he says: 
"Oh, well," and this "Oh, well" means the ab-
solute respect for the absolute telos. If the 
world takes everything from him, he suffers no 
doubt; but he says again: "Oh, well"--and this 
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"Oh, well" means the absolute respect for the ab-
solute telos. Men do not exist in this fashion 
when they live immediately in the finite. (CUP 
368) 
Could not this be suggested as a clear case of indiff-
erence, that an individual who receives everything or 
loses everything has the same attitude: a shrug with 
the seeming nonchalance of an "Oh, well"? Oh, well, 
viewed from without that is the logical interpretation,-
it is even the most natural impression to have. But 
Climacus is dealing with inwardness, a region of being 
inaccesible to logic. 
Moreover, to charge that there is no relation to 
things in Kierkegaard is to miss the humor of Climacus, 
and to be heedless of the daedal contexture of 
Kierkegaard's art. For awakening is his aim, he means 
to wound from behind, and Climacus has the humor and 
dialectical skill to serve as agent provocateur par 
excelle nee. 
To return to Buber, how can there be no relation to 
things in Kierkegaard, when things are expressions of 
finitude? Too; when Kierkegaard himself writes that 
"no one wants to be that strenuous being--the single 
individual,""1 the implication is that it is not easy 
to let go of things, to see them simply as relative 
means to relative ends. Nonetheless, these things are 
there, ineradicably present in existence, serving as 
the presupposition of resignation and faith. Still, 
the single individual refuses to capitulate to the 
finite. But this, obviously, does not mean that he has 
no relation with the finite world of things. 
Dasein, on the other hand, because of his lack of 
infinitude, is deprived of the privilege to put the 
world at arms length at his own behest. When, in the 
case of Dasein, there is a "retreat from," "this 
'repelling from itself' is essentially an 'expelling 
into': a conscious gradual relegation to the vanishing 
w h a t - i s - i n - t o t a l i t y . T h i s disclosure by dread is 
revealed, more specifically, "in the clear night of 
dread's Nothingness." Dasein is compelled to endure 
the occurrence of his withdrawal from the world. Again 
emphasizing Dasein's locked-in finitude, Heidegger 
writes: 
So finite are we that we cannot, of our own reso-
lution and will, bring ourselves originally face 
to face with Nothing. So bottomlessly does 
finalization dig into existence that our free-
dom's peculiar and profoundest finality fails. 
Admittedly, "Being can only happen through the ac-
tivity of men, but no activistic, voluntaristic act of 
the will can force a revelation of being."" And yet, 
it is in the mode of inauthentic everydayness that 
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dread reveals being as nothing. Now, by "everydayness" 
Heidegger means "a definite 'how' of existence by which 
Dasein is dominated through and through 'for life' . . 
. the way in which Dasein is 'manifest' in the 'with-
one-another' of publicness" (BT 422). Everydayness, in 
other words, is a way to be of Dasein. 
But since Dasein is Being-with, it is impossible 
for him to bring about his own withdrawal from the 
world; everydayness prevents him. It is true that "in 
the moment of vision, indeed, and often just 'for that 
moment', existence can even gain the mastery over the 
'everyday'; but it can never extinguish it" (BT 422). 
Existence is here being equated with authenticity and 
contrasted with inauthenticity in the form of the 
everyday. And what Heidegger is alluding to is 
Dasein's inability to exercise dominion over existence, 
that even in the moment of vision (a non-voluntary 
occurrence), the disclosure to him of his very authen-
ticity is an event of Being, not an activistic, volun-
taristic act of the will. For, as was demonstrated 
earlier, although anticipation individualizes Dasein, 
thereby releasing him from the grand illusions of ano-
nymity, anticipation itself is sustained by anxiety, 
and anxiety is not induced by any voluntary means. "So 
bottomlessly does finalization dig into existence that 
our freedom's peculiar and profoundest finality fails." 
A beautiful sentence, this. And the insight is a cou-
rageous one, but its courage is not undergirded by the 
healthy possibility of Anti-Climacus' personality, 
where "the condition of its survival is therefore 
analogous to breathing (respiration), which is an in-
and an a-spiration" (SD 173). 
God, regarded as "the one for whom all things are 
possible," is the source of the believer's "sound 
health of faith," that is, possibility (SD 175). Yet, 
although God is defined by Anti-Climacus as possibil-
ity, and man as a synthesis of possibility and neces-
sity, there is a qualitative difference between them. 
Man's possibilities configure in his imagination, and 
God is "the power which makes possible the imagination 
of possibilities . . . God is the possibility which 
comes to man even when his imagination can no longer 
conjure up a possibility as his own possibility." 5 7 
God, so considered, enables us to discern a similarity 
between Anti-Climacus' believer and Kierkegaard's den 
Enkelte. For in the Journals and Papers Kierkegaard 
writes: "The Single Individual (den Enkelte): this 
principle can be set forth only in a poetic way, for it 
would be presumptuous for anyone to pass himself off as 
being eminently 'The Single Individual'. Consequently 
it is a striving."5* The condition for this striving 
is God, for whom all things are possible. In another 
entry Kierkegaard writes: 
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To Become a Christian, according to the New 
Testament, is to become "spirit." To become 
spirit, according to the New Testament, is to 
die, to die to the world, for according to the 
New Testament no man is born as spirit, and after 
the natural birth to be man is to be body and 
mind. Therefore dying to the world is the crisis 
in which one becomes spirit. 8' 
"The crisis in which one becomes spirit" and 
"striving" point to possibility as the sound health of 
faith. And the object, rather, the subject, of this 
faith is, for Anti-Climacus and Kierkegaard, Christ. 
Coming face to face with Christ or becoming a 
Christian, that is the goal. Characteristically ex-
pressing himself in terms of potentiation, Anti-
Climacus aptly avers: " . . . the more conception of 
Christ, the more self. A self is qualitatively what 
its measure is" (SD 245). 
Now, if in the luxury of Silentio's letters infi-
nite resignation is the movement prior to faith, in 
Anti-Climacus faith is at its extreme. Recall that he 
is the author of The Sickness unto Death, the conclu-
sion of which is a disquisition on "The Sin of 
Abandoning Christianity Modo Ponendo, of Declaring It 
Falsehood." And this, to him, is a sin against the 
Holy Ghost. It is also Anti-Climacus who wrote 
Training in Christianity, considered by Cornelio Fabro 
as "that jewel of Christological theology."" In this 
book Anti-Climacus reflects, with cogent exegetical 
penetration, on the invitation of Christ, "Come hither 
to me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, I will 
.give you rest," and also on Christ's promise to the 
multitude in Bethany, "And I, if I be lifted up from 
the Earth, will draw all unto Myself." 
Once more, if Dasein could not approximate either 
of Silentio's knights, then the most that can be said 
of Dasein in comparison to Anit-Climacus is that he is 
worlds apart from the latter's believer. Aptly enough, 
what is written in The Sickness unto Death is applica-
ble here: "The Christian motto . . is: As thou 
believest, so it comes to pass; or. As thou believest, 
so art thou; to believe is to be" (SD 224). 
Finally, when it is considered that the pseudo-
nymous personae operate within the Christian context 
(accepting it or rejecting it), where the distinction 
between creator and creature presupposes eternity; to 
boot, since the principle of den Enkelte can be set 
forth only poetically, i.e., via the personae, then it 
is only reasonable to conclude that a concept such as 
Heidegger's Dasein cannot emerge from den Enkelte. For 
the absence of the eternal in Heidegger's conceptual 
scheme, and its omnipresence in the world of 
Kierkegaard, makes it impossible for Dasein to be 
derived from den Enkelte. And strictly speaking, what 
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renders the derivation unfeasible is that neither 
Dasein nor den Enkelte is intelligible as substance. 
If they were substances, then one could, perhaps, claim 
that while both beings were essentially the same, they 
nevertheless have certain accidental differences. And 
in this case it could be proffered that the one can 
derive from the other, in the way that a son derives 
from a father. But Dasein and den Enkelte are a "how" 
of being; and my point is that one way of existing can-
not derive from another. Ways of existing are strictly 
disjunctive. Either you live one way or you live 
otherwise, and it is nonsensical to say, for example, 
that a reformed murderer derives from the murderer. Of 
course the murderer here is not referring to 
Heidegger's conceptual scheme and the reformed version 
to Kierkegaard's. The example simply wants to point 
out that the principles of Dasein and den Enkelte are 
hetrogeneous ways of being. This difference carries 
with it immense implications, for an existence deter-
mined by its own temporalization, revering itself as 
sole authority, is qualitatively different from an ex-
istence constituted by eternity, where eternity is the 
source of man's possibility, and possibility his 
respiration, inspiration, and aspiration, that is, the 
ground of his faith. Therefore, at the cost of concep-
tual dissolution, we are better off keeping Dasein and 
den Enkelte in their respective ways of being. 
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